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Introduction
When I see somany young engineers, and such a variety of
notions, I am convinced that some system should be laid
down, to prevent wild and visionary schemes being tried,
at the great danger of injury or loss of life to the public.
George Stephenson, 18411
Stephenson was alarmed at the rapid and often ill-
disciplined growth of the country’s railway system.
Most of these ‘wild and visionary schemes’ were being
promoted by railway companies. The merits of each
scheme had, in theory, to be tested by means of a
debate in Parliament. But getting a Railway Bill enacted
was a lengthy and chaotic process, involving bitter
feuds between landowners, rival transport companies,
town councils and other vested interests. Fighting for
routes and proﬁts tended to take priority over more
fundamental questions about safety and practicality.
Meanwhile, a steady streamof collisions, explosions
and derailments bore witness to the dangers of the new
technology. Occasionally, an accident was so dramatic
that its safety implications could not be brushed aside.
So, in December 1879, when part of the newly-built
Tay Bridge collapsed and 75 people died, an oﬃcial
inquiry was set up within days, and its ﬁndings were
published six months later.2
The proceedings and report of this Inquiry, and the
technical debate which has rumbled on ever since,
make fascinating reading. The sequence of events, and
the tactics of parties involved in this ambitious and
prestigious project, suggest that there is nothing new
under the sun, or, more speciﬁcally, under the mantle
of NHS Connecting for Health.
Contracts and deadlines
The ﬁrst Tay Bridge project was proposed by the Board
of the North British Railway (NBR) in December 1869.
It was to cost £229 000 and to be completed within
three years. After extensive wrangling, and the with-
drawal of the original contractors, a new contract was
signed inMay 1871: the bridgewould now cost £217 000
and be ready in November 1874. In the event, it opened
to traﬃc in May 1878, and cost over £626 000.3
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Two years into the contract, it was discovered that
the original surveys of the river bed had been inaccur-
ate, and so themajority of the bridge’s structure had to
be redesigned. Diﬀerent foundations would now be
required for many of its pillars, and cast iron struc-
tureswere introduced in place of brick, in order to save
weight. Argument still continues as to whether the
new design was inherently weaker than the old, but the
increased use of cast iron undoubtedly led to problems
of quality control in the bridge’s construction.Nor did
it help that the bridge designer, Thomas Bouch, was by
this time absorbed in another major project, devel-
oping his ideas for a revolutionary suspension bridge
across the River Forth.
At around the same time, the main contractor on
the Tay Bridge, Charles de Bergue, died, and his ﬁrm
withdrew from its commitments. They had in any case
been incurring losses on the work. Bouch quickly
struck a deal with one of the other bidders, Edgar
Gilkes, to take over, using substantially the same
workforce. Despite these key changes, and a series of
accidents in the often appalling weather conditions on
the Tay, shareholders in the railway company were
assured that everything was going according to plan.
Completion, they were assured, would be before the
end of 1874.
The stage was now set for a series of deceptions, as
various parties set about protecting their own inter-
ests, and colluded in keeping problems under wraps.
The increased dependence on cast iron meant that a
new foundry had to be set up near the bridge site. The
general engineeringmanager, FrankBeattie, was based
on site, but was regularly duped by the foundry
foreman. Whenever Beattie was sighted heading for
the foundry, cloths were draped strategically over ﬂaws
in the castings. Some really bad castings would be left
prominently displayed, for Beattie to examine and
reject. Having survived this ‘inspection’, the defects
would be concealed by ﬁlling them with a mixture of
beeswax, resin, iron ﬁlings, and lamp black.
Meanwhile, other lapses of oversight were occur-
ring in Middlesbrough, where two sub-contractors
were casting ironwork for the bridge. Knowledge of
the shortcomings in some of the components being
sent north to the Tay must have been quite wide-
spread, but it suited no-one to draw attention to them.
By 1876 the project was running well behind sched-
ule, and getting short of money. The NBR, as sponsor
of the project, now had little option but to raise the
funds for a signiﬁcant amount of extra labour and
machinery, in order for the bridge to be completed.
The contractors agreed to anewdeadlineof 1September,
with a bonus of £2000; this was renegotiated soon
afterwards, to 15 September and £4200. Powerful
lamps were purchased to enable the foundry to operate
through the night, and the workforce was expanded.
This frantic activity improved the rate of progress on
the bridge, but at the cost of still more bodges and
compromises in its assembly. Again, it would have
taken a brave soul to draw attention to any of the
skimped workmanship, especially when so many of
the construction workers were risking their lives in the
stormy conditions on the Tay.
It was not just expediency that led to an acceptance
of imperfections. Legitimate doubts surrounded the
standards which were to be expected. As the Inquiry
pointed out subsequently:
In regard to the imperfection of workmanship and ﬁtting,
it appears that as the substitution of iron for brick piers ...
was made after the contract was let, there are no clauses in
the speciﬁcation describing the class of workmanship to
be employed.2
The renewed eﬀorts resulted in completion of the
main bridge structure close to the revised deadline.
The contractors collected their bonus. A VIP train
rode out onto the bridge and back to Dundee, after
which the passengers had a splendid lunch. A spec-
tacular ﬁrework display was given from the bridge
structure that same evening.
The celebrations were perhaps a little premature.
The bridge could not be opened to traﬃc, as it was not
yet connected with a railway line in either direction.
To the north, slow progress was being made on a
tunnel through Dundee. To the south, track was still
being laid to Leuchars Junction.
The inspector’s report
The bridge also had to be approved by the Board of
Trade. This was intended to provide some reassurance
for the travelling public, but the inspection process
was not particularly thorough. Like many home
surveys today, it only recorded defects that were
readily apparent. As the chairman of the later Inquiry,
himself a lawyer, noted:
There seems to be an impression abroad that, after a work
has been inspected and passed by the oﬃcers of the Board
of Trade, the engineer and others, by whom it has been
constructed, are relieved from responsibility for any
defects, which may subsequently be discovered; but this
can hardly be so.2
The Tay Bridge was, at the time, the longest bridge in
the world, and so there was some debate as to how
exactly it should be tested. In the event, six heavy
engines were driven out onto the bridge, and stopped
and started at various points on it. What the testing
could not establish, since the weather was ﬁne, was
how the bridge, or carriages crossing it, would fare in
bad weather, and particularly in high winds.
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The inspector, aware of this, recommended that
trains should cross the bridge at nomore than 25miles
per hour (mph).2 Since the bridge had various gradi-
ents and a long curve, this called for some ﬁne
judgements, which many engine drivers were reluctant
to bother with. Their cabs had no speedometers, and,
like today’s lorries, they were keen to keep up mo-
mentum. One witness at the Inquiry claimed to have
timed trains crossing at more than 40mph, and the
station master in Dundee had become accustomed to
complaints from passengers, alarmed at the swaying
sensations they had experienced while crossing the
river.
When tragedy eventually struck, it was during a
particularly violent storm. The train was probably
seeking to make up time, as it was running a few
minutes late. The exact cause of the tragedy, however,
may never be known. The barrister who chaired the
Inquiry seems to have been determined to pin asmuch
blame as possible on the designer, Thomas Bouch.
Accordingly he wrote a long and at times impassioned
personal report, highlighting the evidence pointing in
this direction. The two other members of the panel,
both engineers, were more hesitant. They listed some
of the deﬁciencies in the way the bridge had been built,
and reviewed the calculations – often based on rather
vague estimates – concerning the strength of the iron-
work and the eﬀect of wind speeds.2 They recom-
mended the development of new rules ‘regardingwind
pressure in railway structures’. But (perhaps in some
measure because of professional solidarity) they were
reluctant to apportion blame.
Failures of oversight
Like NHS Connecting for Health, the Tay Bridge
project was ambitious in its scale, but not particularly
innovative in its design or use of technology. The great
length of the bridge, and its dramatic setting, captured
the popular imagination, and public reputations were
quickly bound up with its success. Commercial press-
ures meant that the NBR pushed its contractors hard,
to enable it to open up the new eastern route into
Scotland as quickly as possible, and contracts for the
bridge included both incentives and penalties. Events
showed, however, that these counted for little if the
contracts themselves were incomplete, or based on
wrong assumptions.
Management of the project was formally divided
between theNBR, as commissioners of the bridge, and
the Tay Bridge Undertaking, who were responsible for
building it. But it was not quite as simple as that. The
appearance of an adversarial relationship was useful in
trying to placate irate NBR shareholders, but behind
the scenes the parties often had a common agenda. For
example, neither was keen to draw attention to any
setbacks in the construction work, or escalations in
cost. As timewent on,withmore andmore investment
committed to the project, the inﬂuence and bargain-
ing position of the NBR gradually weakened.
The engineers responsible for constructing the
bridge faced a number of pressures: to meet deadlines,
to constrain costs and to carry on working regardless
of the weather. These problems would have been
familiar to them, as would have been the remedy – a
judicious use of short cuts, based on the assumption
that the original design had been deliberately over-
speciﬁed. Often this was indeed the case, but not
always: for example, Bouch had opted for a minimal
approach to some aspects of the bracing, in order to
save on cost and weight.
Engineering was in any case a young profession,
comparable in some ways to IT today. Individuals
earned their reputations through experience in a par-
ticular aspect of project work, such as sinking caissons
or erecting girders. This did not necessarily equip
them to spot potential weak points in the structure
as a whole. Once the bridge was built and routine
maintenance began, the dangers of this compartment-
alisation became particularly evident. Henry Noble
was appointed to oversee the maintenance work, and
as the two engineers on the Inquiry team observed,
with impeccable courtesy:
The arrangements for the supervision of the bridge after
its completion were not satisfactory, inasmuch as it was
intrusted solely to Henry Noble, who, although an intel-
ligent man and very competent in the class of work to
which he had been accustomed, possessed no experience
in structures of iron work ... 2
Mr Noble did, nevertheless, attempt to carry out
repairs on the ironwork, not always to good eﬀect.
To eliminate looseness in some of the bridge’s tie-bars,
for example, he hammeredwedges into the gaps which
had opened up. This was an inappropriate and dan-
gerous remedy, since although it eliminated the rat-
tling, it also distorted and weakened the structure.
After the Tay Bridge disaster, engineering gradually
moved towards more systematic methods for the man-
agement of major projects. Politicians, entrepreneurs
and journalists, on the other hand, were less inclined
to see any of the systemic problems. Joseph Chamber-
lain, as President of the Board of Trade, joined the
clamour for blame to be laid squarely on Thomas
Bouch. The press, having at ﬁrst hailed the bridge as a
triumph formodern engineering, abruptly changed its
tune, and made heroes and villains according to its
favourite prejudices. The NBR, anxious to rebuild or
replace the bridge, began to distance itself from those
involved in the original venture.
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Little attempt was made to explore or understand
some of the more institutional factors that lay behind
the disaster. Quality checks had apparently been in
place, but had often been circumvented with ease. The
Board of Trade inspection carried out in three days of
ﬁne weather had not revealed any serious structural
weaknesses. Precautionary measures recommended
by the Inspector, such as the speed limit, were not
adhered to. Throughout the project,many of those who
built and maintained the bridge felt it would be
prudent to keep quiet about any worrying signs they
had noticed, suggestive of defects in construction. In
any case, there was no guarantee that such concerns
would have been passed on: Henry Noble, for example,
Reproduced with permission of Dundee City Council, Central Library.
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hadno contactwith the company engineer responsible
for the state of the rails over the bridge, even though
the track and bridge were bolted to one another.
The project showed quite clearly, for anyone pre-
pared to look closely, that a hasty commissioning
process, based on inadequate information, followed
by aggressive contracts and deadlines, invited trouble.
Also, that the dividing line between reasonable am-
bition and recklessness was a fragile one. Once every-
one had been recruited into the project’s dramatic
vision, it was hard for any dissenting voice to be raised;
even if it had been, poor lines of communication
reduced the chances of it having any eﬀect.
Some conclusions
Themoral of the story is not that NHS Connecting for
Health is doomed to failure. It is that human responses
in large projects remain forever the same, regardless of
the technology. For example, builders may overesti-
mate the foresight of designers. Supervisorsmay take a
blinkered view of their responsibilities, and processes
of regulation may be warmly endorsed, even though
no-one quite believes in them. Where the profession
surrounding the technology is young (as is the case,
relatively speaking, in IT), people may misjudge the
skills of themselves or others. And where people are
required to follow rules, whether in driving engines
or using smart cards, it is essential that the rules are
practicable, and their purpose is widely understood.
A new Tay Bridge was eventually built alongside the
old, and opened in 1887. It still stands. Much greater
care went into its design and construction, in the light
of experience from the previous venture. The London
Ambulance Service went through a similar catharsis
with its despatch service: a disastrous ﬁrst implemen-
tation,4 in 1992, was followed by a model project
which successfully achieved its objectives (but with
much less publicity).5 Perhaps onemoral is thatmajor
projects should all be executed as though for the
second time.
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